



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

A POLICY FOR THE ALLIES

ALACK of political acumen, not to say decency, has marked for generations the statesmanship of the Near East, and especially of the Austrian rulers. The Empire of Austria came under a common ruler in 1789, when she inherited two opposing policies which she continued to try to perpetuate and to reconcile until disillusioned by Germany in 1866. These two policies were, first, an attempt to bring Germany under Austrian control; second, to join with the Ottoman and to unify the Balkans. Pursuing sometimes the one, sometimes the other, sometimes both, she failed in all, until in 1867 there was formed the Dual Monarchy. Eleven years later this Monarchy became a "temporary administrator" of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both of which, twenty years later, she "annexed." The whole policy here briefly outlined led naturally to the ruthless oppression of all Slavs within the new empire, constituting 40 per cent of Austrian subjects, and ended, as a matter of course, in a challenge to the rest of Europe. It showed an utter lack of creative moral force, of unity, and especially did it reveal a wilful disregard for the aspirations of the Serbian-speaking people, sometimes called Serbians, sometimes Croats, sometimes Slovenes, but all with a common language and kindred ideals. Besides these southern or Jugo-Slavs, there are the northern Slavs, or Czecho-Slovaks, equally mistreated by the Germans and Magyars. Tyranny and oppression are the modes of Austrian politics. Since the beginning of this war thousands of Czech civilians have been executed. Austria's behavior towards these races makes one of the most distressing chapters in all the history of governmental ineptitude and inefficiency.

Germany, assuming the leadership in mid-Europe following her victory over Austria in 1866, has shown no such lack of political deftness or definiteness. Germany, using Austria as a tool, has headed persistently toward a Central European Federation, with her eyes upon British India and the Far East. Germany's *Deutschtum* has been big, constructive, far-seeing, and extremely clear. Germany has known for two generations exactly what she wants. Friedrich Naumann's dream of "Central Europe" was in the Kaiser's mind when on May 12 he conferred with the Austrian Emperor at Great German Headquarters and brought Austria another long step nearer to absolute military and economic German control. Vice-Chancellor von Payer frankly says that Germany and Austria-Hungary must dominate Russia, Poland, Bulgaria and Turkey in order that the peace of Europe may rest in

the hands of the Teutonic Allies. The German purpose is precise.

But with the nations now arrayed against Germany there is neither such definiteness nor constructive policy. True, we say we must win the war, and win the war we must. But, again we ask, is it not possible for us to aid in the very process of winning the war by combining with our muscle a greater measure of brains? To say that we purpose to thwart the German plans for Middle Europe is well enough, as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. Neither is it enough for us to express our "earnest sympathy" with these aspiring nationalities. If Austria failed through a lack of positive and constructive purpose, and if Germany has thus far succeeded because she had just that kind of purpose, it seems reasonable that our strategy would be immeasurably strengthened were we to fashion and to support a political policy commensurate with the size of our military program. There are those who believe, and we are of them, that by the use of political power within the Austrian Empire we could attack Germany from the rear effectively, aid our military plans immeasurably, and go a long way toward straightening out the incompetencies and injustices heaped upon the northern and the southern Slavs through all these long years. The opportunity seems to be at hand to take advantage of the legitimate ambitions of these twenty-seven million Slavs now unjustly dominated by the remnants of the artificial Hapsburg dynasty.

America's attempts to comfort these peoples have not been altogether successful. The President's kindly words, December 4, 1917, relating to Austria have been misinterpreted by the Slavs to our hurt. Even our friendly words about a free Poland with a seaport have not been as effective as they might be. The need is for something more than sympathetic words. The time is at hand when we should specifically recognize the justice of the claims of the ethnic and economic units known as the Czecho-Slovaks in Bohemia and parts of Moravia, and also of the Jugo-Slavs or South Slavs, whose territory includes Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and other sections of south Austria. This much can be done now. Indeed, this has been done by England, France, and Italy. We have but to attain unity with them on this point. We ought to be able to exercise the same wisdom with the Ukrainian and other Russian provinces, with the Finns of the North, and with the Roumanian and Italian sections as well. Perhaps these latter problems, like the problems involved in Russia and in the Balkan questions, are still too deep for us, and we suspect they are; not so with these sections in north and south Austria. We have long recognized

Bohemia's political claims. Those claims are nearer and more vital to us today than ever before. The claims of the Jugo-Slavs, while less familiar to us, are none the less just as vital. Where Americans find time to study the Austro-Hungary situation, they invariably conclude that the ordinary principles of nationality require that the Dual Monarchy must provide somehow for the independent national existence of four distinct groups within that territory, namely, German, Magyar, Czecho-Slovaks, and Jugo-Slav. We believe, also, that we should know our own minds about the Polish-speaking peoples, the Roumanians, the Ruthenians or Little Russians, and the Italian-speaking areas; but allied policy imperatively demands ready action in the case of these revolting Slavs. Bohemian independence would of itself mean an end of the Middle-Europe menace. We should go to her aid even as France came to our aid when a similar struggle faced us. Deprived of its ancient independence by force, even of its constitution granted by the Hapsburgs in 1848, Bohemia remembers the decree of Francis Joseph recognizing the Czech nation in 1871 and asks now only for what is her own. If the right of self-determination means anything it means something here.

What are we going to do? *The New Republic*, under date of June 15, referring to this situation, says: "This means that the first step toward the definite break-up of Austria-Hungary must be the establishment of a league of nations. It is not worth while to call Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia into existence, to succumb shortly to German imperialistic enterprise. But no one would deny that it is worth while to call them into existence as free members of a great world league pledged to defend them against foreign aggression. . . . Such an association is needed now, as a guaranty to Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs, Russians and Ukrainians and Finns, that if they will throw off the net of German influence the nations of the world stand ready to defend their independence forever. . . . Until Slavdom in their rear rises in a conflagration of revolt, the Russians rolling back over the lands lost at Brest-Litovsk, the Roumanians and Jugo-Slavs forcing upon Bulgaria and Hungary a mood for peace, the Czecho-Slovaks and Poles menacing Germany in the flank"—not until then will Germany take of her own volition her proper place, "deriving her security, not from her own broken sword, but, like the least of the nations, from the might and good will of the community of the world."

While we regret that we cannot agree with this position so far as a league to enforce neutrality of the new States is concerned, yet we are pleased to note the grow-

ing sentiment that these new States should be established and admitted to the Society of Nations. We would go so far as to say that we should recognize them as we recognized the Russian Revolution. The Czecho-Slovak National Council claims to be a provisional Republican Government for Bohemia. Possibly we could at least recognize that. Since a league of nations to enforce neutrality of the rights of small nations has neither prevented wars nor prevented the destruction of small nations, this suggestion of the enforce-peace-ers may be ignored. The proposal of a league to enforce the will of that league is an institution of force, and as such an inevitable menace to the peace of the world. We may well defer insisting upon leagues to enforce their will by arms, and first set up for all the nations the machinery of justice to which all nations may of right appeal, where all nations shall of right be heard, and where all nations shall of right receive their just rewards. This in itself is a long, long way, but it is the only way for States to evolve into that unity of behavior where law and equity shall be established and the rights and duties of States shall be adequately observed and performed.

Therefore, while Germany blindly aims to win Finland, Courland, Lithuania, Poland at the point of the bayonet, the Allied political strategy for the moment, and for the future, as well as our moral responsibility, is to win to the Society of Nations by the power of good will and good deeds these oppressed peoples by recognizing now the aspirations of these nationalities, by insisting upon them as terms of peace, and by providing for their perpetual fulfillment through the collective judgment of all the Powers as expressed in law-making and law-interpreting institutions universally supported and universally accepted.

FORCE AND A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

READERS of this magazine have noticed the persistency with which we run each month on our front page "A Governed World." A superficial reading of that page will, we assume, convince all that this Society believes in a League of Nations. Not that we hold a brief for that particular name, because the Society of Nations by any other name would be to us just as sweet. We are concerned with the thing. Whatever the name the nations may be brought to agree upon will be generally acceptable and accepted, whether that name be a League of Nations, a Federation, a Confederation, an Association, a Con-sociation, a Union, or even a Verband. We may note that the United States and the British Empire are both Leagues of Nations. That